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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS IN AIRSPACE
By
JOHN A. EUBANK*
The subject of property rights in airspace is one in which there has existed
for a number of years two divergent viewpoints as between the surface owners and
the aircraft operators. As a result of this conflict there were considerable legal
controversy and not a little actual litigation. Briefly speaking, the landowner
contended that he owned and was entitled to the exclusive right to the airspace
superincumbent to his land, upward to an indefinite extent, to zenith; whereas the
aircraft operator claimed that there was no ownership or exclusive right to the
airspace by the subjacent owner unless the latter actually physically occupied the
airspace above surface ownership through the erection of a structure or some
object therein.'
Prior to the event of aircraft, particularly the airplane, the courts had almost
universally upheld the surface owners rights to all the airspace superincumbent
to surface ownership. In doing so the courts followed the ancient maxim cujus
est solum ejus est usque ad coelum which translated freely of course reads, "he
who owns the surface owns upward to the sky."2 It must be borne in mind that
these early pre-aeronautical decisions were concerned with trespass and nuisance
cases in which the use of the airspace by the defendants concerned objects which
were fixed to and relatively near the surface, and there was no trespass in or use
of the airspace at distances far removed from the surface as is the case of the use of
aircraft at considerable heights above the surface. These earlier and pre-aeronautical
decisions concerned trespass and nuisance actions with reference to overhanging
eaves, cornices, windows and other parts of buildings, overhanging trees, tele-
phone wires, protruding human arm, the kick of a horse, the firing of shots, etc.'
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With the event of the airplane and the use and passage in the airspace by it,
the courts very properly took a more modern viewpoint of airspace ownership
and rights therein by the surface owner. Recognizing the right of flight as an
inherent natural right4 and of the fact that the use of the airspace by the surface
owner was within a relatively low altitude of the surface, the courts in consequence
have uniformaly held that the surface owner's rights to the airspace above was
only within the realm that was necessary to the reasonable use and enjoyment of
the surface. 5 While this judicial viewpoint was the crystallization of judicial
pronouncements and the uniform decisions of the courts, there were occasional
extreme and opposing claims to the airspace by the surface owner on the one
hand and the aircraft operator on the other. In these conflicts, the landowner
claimed exdusive possession and ownership of the airspace up to indefinite
heights, and the aircraft operator denied that the surface owners had any rights
in the airspace except as to such parts thereof which were actually physically
possessed as to the erection of a structure therein or other occupancy thereof.
Incredible as it may seem, a committee on aeronautical law of one of the leading
bar associations, over the opposition of one lone dissenter of such committee,
supported the latter viewpoint.' Moreover, while many state courts including the
highest, and federal district and circuit court of appeals had ruled on the ques-
tion of rights in airspace, the United States Supreme Court had never spoken ol
the subject.
Finally, on May 27, 1946, the United States Supreme Court in U. S. vs.
Causby had occasion to pass on the important question of property rights in air-
space. Prior to this decision there had developed a legal doctrinnaire, promul-
gated and pronounced by Professor John A. Eubank, a close student of aero-
nautical jurisprudence." This doctrinnaire was and is known as the Doctrine
Of The Airspace Zone of Effective Possession. It has been accepted and reaf-
firmed by countless judicial decisions.7& By the Doctrine Of The Airspace Zone
Of Effective Possession is meant that surface owners have exclusive right to that
part of the airspace superincumbent to their surface ownership which is necessary
to the reasonable use and enjoyment of the surface. There need not be actual
4
Aeronautical Jurisprudence, Vol. II, Page 140, Professor John A. Eubank.
5Johnson vs. Curtis Northwest Airplane Co., 1928 U. S. Av. R. 42; Smith vs. New England Air-
craft Co., Inc., et al, 270 Mass. 511; Swetland vs. Curtis Airports Corp., et al, 55 Fed. (2d)
201; Gay et al vs. Taylor et al, 1934 U. S. Av. R. 126; Thrasher vs. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga.
514; Hinman vs. United Air Lines, et al, 84 Fed. (2d) 755; "Ownership of The Airspace,"
John A. Eubank, Dickinson Law Review, Jan., 1930; "Who Owns The Airspace," John A.
Eubank, Current History, April, 1929.
ONew York County Lawyers Assn. Pamphlet, July 1933.
'7"The Doctrine of The Airspace Zone of Effective Possession." John A. Eubank, Boston University
Law Review, June, 1932; "The Doctrine of The Airspace Zone of Effective Possession," John A.
Eubank, American Bar Assn. Journal, December 1932.
7aSmith vs. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511; Cory vs. Physical Culture Hotel, Inc., (Pa.)
1938 U. S. Av. R. 16; Hinman vs. United Air Lines, 84 P. (2d) 755; Mohican et al. vs.
Tobiasz et al, 1938 U. S. Av. R. 1.
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physical possession of the zone of effective possession, because it is the zone which
can be "effectively possessed" in connection with the reasonable use and enjoy-
ment of the surface. See Eubank articles, supra. Hence constructive possession
is effective possession. In Smith vs. New England Aircraft Co., supra, the learned
Massachusetts Court said:
"Even if this suggestion of extreme limit be adopted
as the test, namely that the scope of possible trespass is limited
by that of possible effective possession, the plaintiffs seemed
entitled to assert that there have been trespassers upon their
land. The test suggested is not actual but possible effective
possession. It is not decisive that the plaintiffs do not at the
present make that possible effective possession a realized
occupation."
Moreover the zone of effective possession will vary with the us'e to which the
surface is put. Under some circumstances the zone may be relatively near the
surface, while under different situations the zone may extend to higher altitudes.
See Eubank articles, supra. Although the Eubank Doctrine Of The Airspace
Zone Of Effective Possession pronounced by the author in 1932 and prior thereto
had met some reluctance upon the part of students of aeronautical jurisprudence
and on occasions even opposition, the courts as far back as 1930 began to
recognize the soundness of the doctrine and to give it judicial sanction.8
Briefly the facts in the Causby case before the United States Supreme Court
are as follows:
Causby owned and operated a chicken farm of two and eight-tenths acres
eight miles outside Greensboro, North Carolina and near an airport which had
been leased by and was jointly operated by the United States with other users.
The farm consisted of a dwelling house and the usual various outbuildings which
are part of a chicken farm. The ends of the airport runways were about 2,200
feet from Causby's residence and chicken houses, and the path of glide of the
airplanes using the airport was directly over Causby's property, which property
was about 100 feet wide and 1200 feet long. At the safe gliding angle of 30
to 1 approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority, planes in passing over the
farm flew at the extremely low altitude of 87 feet which was with a clearance
of only 67 feet over the dwelling and 63 feet above the barns and but 18 feet
over the treetops. As the airport was used by bombers, transports and fighter
planes, the noise was terrifying. The passage of aircraft was frequent and the
glare of the planes' lights at night brightly lighted up Causby's property. Chickens
were so frightened that they would fly against the wall and were destroyed,
Production also fell off to a large extent. Causby and his family had been denied
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of their sleep, became nervous and frightened, and the use of the property both
as a residence and chicken farm had been greatly impaired. The Court of Claims,
found that the property had as the result become greatly depreciated in value,
that the United States had taken an easement over the property, and that the value
of the property destroyed and the easement taken amounted to $2,000.
The Supreme Court noted that the case was one of first impression. The
United States specifically contended that since the flights were within the minimum
safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority, that they
were an exercise of the declared right of travel through the airspace as provided
for in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. Also the government advanced the
flimsy argument that Causby did not own the superincumbent airspace because
he had not subjected it to possession by the erection of structures and other
occupancy. Finally the government declared that if it took airspace owned by
Causby the damages were merely consequential for which no compensation could
be obtained under the Fifth Amendment.
At the outset, the Supreme Court repudiated the ancient maxim cujus est
solum ejus est usque ad coelum by stating that the doctrine of ownership to the
periphery of the universe had no place in the modern world. (See The Doctrine
Of The Airspace Zone of Effective Possession, John A. Eubank, American Bar
Association Journal, December 1932). Moreover the Court very specifically re-
affirmed the right of flight9 by stating that, "the air is a public highway, as
Congress has declared." The Court distinguished the case from that of Richards
vs. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. 546, in which recovery of damage was
denied to property owners who were annoyed by the noise, smoke and vibration
of passing railroad trains, by stating that the damages in the instant case were
not incidental because the airplanes passed directly over Causby's property, and
thus the land was appropriated as directly and completely as if it were used for
the runways themselves. Referring to the legal philosophy in the decision of
Portsmouth Co. vs. U. S., 260 U. S. 327, the Court said:
"The path of glide for airplanes might reduce a valuable
factory site to grazing land, an orchar to a ve etable patch,
a residential section to a wheat field. Some value would re-
main. But the use of the airspace imm'ediately above the land
would limit the utility of the land and cause a diminution in
its value."
Continuing, the decision pointed out that the navigable airspace to which
flight is permitted under the Civil Aeronautics Act is airspace above the mini-
mum safe altitudes of flight, and such minimum safe altitudes of flight do not
include the path of glide necessary to taking off and landing. On this point the
Court stated:
9
"Aeronautical Jurisprudence," Prof. John A. Eubank, Vol. 11, Page 160
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"The fact that the path of glide taken by the planes was
that approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority does not
change the result. The navigable airspace which Congress has
placed in the public domain is 'airspace above the minimum
safe altitudes of fight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority', 49 U. S. C. Sec. 180. If that agency prescribed
83 feet as the minimum safe altitude, then we would have
presented the question of the validity of the regulation. But
nothing of the sort has been done. The path of glide gov-
erns the method of operating---of landing or taking off.
The altitude required for that operation is not the minimum
safe altitude of flight which is the downward reach of the
navigable airspace. The minimum prescribed by the author-
ity is 500 feet during the day and 1000 feet at night for air
carriers (Civil Air Regulations, Pt. 61, Sec. 61.7400,
61.7401, Code Fed. Reg. Cum. Supp., Tit. 14, ch. 1) and
from 300 feet to 1000 feet for other aircraft depending on
the type of plane and the character of the terrain, Id., Pt.
60, Sec. 60.350-60.3505, Fed. Reg. Cum. Supp., supra.
Hence, the flights in question were not within the navigable
airspace which Congress placed within the public domain.
If any airspace needed for landing or taking off were in-
cluded, flights which were so close to the land as to render
it uninhabitable would be immune. But the United States
concedes, as we have said, that in that event there would be
a taking. Thus, it is apparent that the path of glide is not the
minimum safe altitude of fight within the meaning of the
statute. The Civil Aeronautics Authority has, of course, the
power to prescribe air traffic rules. But Congress has defined
navigable airspace only in terms of one of them-the mini-
mum safe altitudes of flight."
Relative to the part of the airspace which is subject to ownership by a sub-
jacent owner, the Court declared that the landowner owns at least as much of the
airspace above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land.
Adopting the principle of the The Doctrine of the Airspace Zone of Effective
Possession, and citing Professor John A. Eubank's article, "The Doctrine of
The Airspace Zone of Effective Possession," Boston University Law Review, June
1932, the decision stated:
"While the owner does not in any physical manner occupy
that stratum of airspace or make use of it in the conven-
tional sense, he does use it in somewhat the same sense that
space left between buildings for the purpose of light and air
is used. The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so
close to the land that continuous invasions of it affect the use
of the surface of the land itself. We think that the landowner,
as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it and that
invasions of it are in the same category as invasions of the
surface."
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Also reaffirming the right of ownership in airspace up to reasonable heights
and likewise reaffirming the inherent right of flight and lastly restating the
principle of sovereignty in airspace by the individual states, the Court, in citing
the North Carolina statutes, declared:
"Sovereignty in the airspace rests in the State 'except where
granted to and assumed by the United States.' Gen. Stats.
1943, Sec. 63-11. The flight of aircraft is lawful 'unless
at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then existing
use to which the land or water, or the space over the land or
water, is put by the owner, or unless so conducted as to b'e
imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on
the land or water beneath.' Id., Sec. 63-13. Subject to that
right of flight, 'ownership of the space above the lands and
waters of this State is declared to be vested in the several
owners of the surface beneath.' Id., Sec. 63-12. Our hold-
ing that there was an invasion of respondents' property is thus
not inconsistent with the local law governing a landowner's
claim to the immediate reaches of the superadjacent airspace."
It was specifically pronounced by the Court that the airplane is a part of the
modern environment of life, and the inconveniences which it causes are nor-
mally not compensable under the Fifth Amendment, and that the airspace
apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain;
and further it was not necessary for the court to determine in the instant case
as to what those precise limits are, because flights over private land are not a
taking unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate
interference with the enjoyment and use of the land. In this connection the
Court stated it need not speculate on that phase of the present case because
the findings of the Court of Claims plainly established that there was a diminution
in value of the property and that the frequent, low-level flights were the direct
and immediate cause. The decision concluded with the holding that the dam-
ages were not merely consequential, but were the product of a direct invasion
of Causby's domain, and it is the character of the invasion not the amount of
damages resulting from it, so long as the damage is substantial, that determines
the question whether it is a taking. The decision agreed with the Court of
Claims that a servitude had been imposed on the land. The judgment was re-
versed and the case remanded to the Court of Claims to make the necessary
finding in conformity with the opinion and to consider whether the easement
taken was a permanent or temporary one and make the award accordingly. Mr.
Justice Douglas rendered the opinion and Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case. Both Justices Black and Burton dis-
sented in a separate opinion. The Court of Claims had upheld that there was a
taking and had rendered judgment for respondent.
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The extremists in the two opposing camps, that of the surface owner and
that of the aircraft operator, can both take comfort from the decision. The sur-
face owner has been sustained in his claim of ownership of airspace and the air-
craft operator has been upheld that such ownership does not extend to the peri-
phery of the universe. Thus by citing and accepting the Eubank Doctrine of
the Airspace Zone of Effective Possession, the Supreme Court reconciled the diff-
erence between the landowner and the aircraft operator, but most important of
all reached a logical constructive solution. In this connection, perhaps the most
significant part of the Court's decision was that if the landowner is to have full
enjoyment of his subjacent area he must have exclusive control of the immediate
reaches of the enveloping atmosphere, and the fact that a surface owner does not
occupy the immediate reaches of the airspace in a physical sense as by the erection
of buildings and the like, is not material.
On the whole the decision was a victory for surface owners in general. Few
were the landowners who claimed ownership of the airspace to the periphery of
the universe. By the large, subjacent owners merely wanted to be free from the
annoyance and dangers of low flying aircraft and which low flying was at times
terrifying and exceedingly hazardous to all concerned. No one would deny the
justice of the Causby claim. Who would question the injustice of four-engined
aircraft, notably bombing planes, flying over one's dwelling with a clearance of
about 67 feet? Would the average resident owner care to be the victim of such
low and hazardous flying?
The Causby decision by the United States Supreme Court is a most impor-
tant and significant one by the highest court in the land, and is of epoch making
consequences in that it reaffirms and gives judicial sanction by that high court
to the following legal concepts, some of which have been previously accepted
and others challenged.
1. The dual sovereignty in the airspace by both the United
States and the individual states.
2. Ownership in airspace by surface owners but with the un-
qualified repudiation of such ownership extending to the
periphery of the universe.
3. The Doctrine Of The Airspace Zone Of Effective Pos-
session.
4. The right of flight.
This decision by the highest court in the land is a clear cut judicial expres-
sion. It is a most able and constructive one. Moreover it has the emphasis of
finality and reaches a sound logical conclusion.
The lessons to be learned from the development of the law and the Su-
preme Court's decision in the Causby case, relative to rights in the airspace, are
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(1) if aircraft always fly above the minimum safe altitudes as prescribed by the
Civil Aeronautics Act and the regulations thereunder, and (2) sufficiently large
airports are provided for so that aircraft in taking off and landing will not fly
over private property, for example, with a mere clearance of 18 feet, then there
will be few trespass and nuisance actions against aircraft from flying over private
property and the aircraft industry will be saved from the burden and expense
of much preventable litigation. It is recognized that in ascending and descend-
ing from and to the ground an aircraft must of course fly at low altitudes. This
is no justification for flying low over private property. The remedy is to acquire
sufficiently large enough airports and landing strips so that the aircraft will be
within the boundary of the airport property and not over private property when
the aircraft is at necessarily low altitudes in landing and taking off. (See Smith
vs. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, and Prof. Eubank's article, supra).
The progress in the law with reference to the airspace together with the
United States Supreme Court's decision in U. S. vs. Causby, taken together, are
the greatest single legal development in the entire history of aeronautics. This
historical development of the law climaxed by the Causby case is indeed a signal
epoch in both aeronautical jurisprudence and the aeronautical industry. No
longer need there be any unnecessary controversy as to the use of the airspace
by aircraft and the extent of the surface owners' rights in such airspace. After
many years of conflicting claims by the surface owner and the aircraft operator,
the issue has been finally, completely and clearly settled to the relief of all con-
cerned. And it can be truthfully said also to the entire satisfaction of all in-
terested parties. The solution arrived at by the United States Supreme Court
and the legal doctrinnaire of aeronautical legal experts, has been a most equitable
one.
